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"There are practical as well as theoretical reasons for not excusing (the owner). The
rule we are adopting tends to make the streets safer by discouraging the hazardous
conduct which the ordinance forbids. It puts the burden of the risk, as far as may b%
upon those who create it."' 2
This is to be compared with a statement by the Massachusetts court in Sulli-
van v. Griffin:
"The plaintiff's contentions go far toward making the defendant an insurer as to the
consequences of every accident in which his automobile might become involved while
operated by the original thieves or their successors m possession. This is a course
upon which, even if it were open we decline to embark."25
It should be kept in mind that this "judicial policy" is neither absolute nor
inflexible. It must be administered as to the facts presented in each case. A crimi-
nal act is never a superseding cause per se, but only when the surrounding facts
are such that under no rational interpretation of these facts could the intervening
act have been foreseen. Or, more realistically, where the court feels that it would
be improper that the original actor bear the risk of the thief's negligent act. The
principal case involves a set of facts on which the greater number of courts have
refused to extend liability for the criminal's act. Yet it can hardly be said that the
same courts, confronted by a different fact situation, would hold the act to be a
superseding cause as a matter of law.2
6
George Moscone
LABOR LAW. FEDERAL vs. STATE JURISDICTION-COMMON LAW ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR CONDUCT WHICH IS ALSO AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UNDER
LMRA.
In the recent Supreme Court decision of United Construction Workers v. La-
burnum,' it was held that a state court could award damages for tortious conduct
of a union organization even though such conduct was also an unfair labor practice
under the Labor Management Relations Act.2 The plaintiff contractor filed a
common law tort action for damages allegedly caused by the conduct of the umon
which resulted in his losing his contracts with the construction company. The
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond found the defendant union guilty of threat-
ening and intimidating employees of the contractor in an effort to induce them
to join the union. Finding this to be a interference with advantageous relations,
the court awarded compensatory and punitive damages under the common law of
Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Virginia affirmed
the decision and modified the amount of the damages awarded.3 On a writ of cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling, concerning itself solely with the
jurisdictional question.
24 139 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
25318 Mass. 359, 362, 61 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1945).2 6 Illinois and New Jersey both held, on facts similar to the principal case, that the criminal
act was a superseding cause. But see Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 383 111. 366, 50 N.E.2d
497 (1943) ; Brower v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 At. 166
(1918). In these cases it was held, on facts different from the principal case, that the defendant
was liable for the intervening acts of criminals which he should have foreseen.
1347 U.S. 656 (1954).
2 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
3 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953).
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The ruling of the principal case seems to be a partial solution of the question
of Federal vs. State jurisdiction in labor disputes. This problem of Federalism in
the field of labor relations has been a thorn in the judicial side since the passage
of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935.4 This question was heightened in
1947 with the passage of the complex and controversial Taft-Hartley Act.5 Since
no statutory guides to jurisdiction were laid down and the language of the Acts
was extremely broad, the result has been a body of federal and state cases with
confused, confusing and contradictory decisions in labor litigation. On these shift-
ing sands of judicial precedent, the rulings of the Supreme Court uneasily rest.
On first examination of Supreme Court holdings in labor controversies it ap-
pears their attitude has pointed towards complete federal occupation of the labor
field and that states have been totally excluded. But a closer analysis of the lead-
ing cases would seem to indicate a concurrent federal and state jurisdiction. 6 State
action has only been excluded when it was in direct conflict with and repugnant to
federal policies and procedures. In the Laburnum case, this view was apparently
solidified and expressly stated in the first case to reach the high court in which the
state had jurisdiction of a dispute on the basis of common law tort and the conduct
was also an unfair practice under LMRA. The Court's holding, in effect that
NLRB and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, appears too farreaching. It
is here submitted that this ruling must be narrowed down since the states are
excluded from any action within the purview of Section 303 of the LMRA, which
concerns secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes. As a result, the decision
will not have the clarifying effect on the jurisdictional question it was apparently
intended to have and the problem of federalism is still present.
In the Laburnum case, the defense contended that where interstate commerce
was involved in a labor dispute and the conduct constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice under Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the LMRA, the states were excluded from enter-
taining a common law tort action for the recovery of damages. The dissenting
opinion by Justice Douglas adopted this view and held that the Taft-Hartley Act
had so completely occupied the labor relations fields that state regulation was pre-
cluded unless expressly authorized. The dissent relied on the broad implications
of Garner v. Teamsters7 and said that since the Supreme Court had excluded state
injunctive relief against an unfair labor practice, like reasons should prevent the
states from giving any other sanction to conduct which was also an unfair labor
practice.
The majority opinion distinguished the Garner case on the ground that Con-
gress had set up administrative machinery and the state procedure was in direct
449 STAT. 449 et seq., 29 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 151 et seq. (1953) Cox and Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAuv. L. Rav. 211 et seq. (1950), Hall, The Taft-Hartley
Act v. State Regulation, 1 J. PUB. LAW 97 (1952), Rose, The Labor Management Relations
Act and the States Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. Rlv. 765 (1953), Note, 27 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 468 (1952), Note, 6 STAN. L. Rlv. 555 (1954), Note, 7 VAND. L. Rv. 374 (1954).
Supra note 2.6 Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), Inter-
national Union UAW, CIO v. O'Bnen, 339 U.S. 454 (1950), Plankington Packing Co. v
WERB, 338 U.S. 953 (1950), LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18 (1949), Beth-
lehem Steel Co. v NYSLRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947), Hill v. Florida ex tel. Watson, 325 U.S.
301 (1945).
7 Garner et al. v Teamsters, Chauffers and Helpers Local Umon # 776 (AFL), 346 U.S.
485 (1953).
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conflict. However, the LMRA had not provided any machinery for the awarding
of damages. Thus it was reasoned that denial of state action here would create a
vacuum and allow the union to escape liability for its tortious conduct. The court
points to Section 303 (b) as the one place in the LMRA which expressly states a
judicial remedy of damages and allows recovery to private parties in federal dis-
trict court or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties.8 The Court
holds that this is consistent with traditional state jurisdiction for enforcement of
criminal penalties and common law liabilities generally. "This is inserted," the
Court said, "to assure uniformity in rights of recovery in the state courts and also
grants jurisdiction to the Federal Courts without respect to the amount in con-
troversy.")9
Section 303 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act states:
"Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of
subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor m any district court of the United States
subject to the limitations and provisions of Section 301 hereof without respect to the
amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and
shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.", 9
The Laburnum decision, in relying on this section for support, clearly interpreted
it as granting a remedy which could be enforced in dither a federal or state tri-
bunal. The Court held this concurrent jurisdiction to be consistent with their ruling
that a state could give remedial relief where the conduct was also an unfair labor
practice under LMRA. On closer examination, the section seems to create a federal
right enforceable only in a federal court, therefore the section was apparently
misinterpreted.
In looking to the language of the section, it must be borne in mind that literal-
ness'is not the sole touchstone of legislative construction. 1 It has been intimated
in a recent Supreme Court opinion that the words in Section 303 (b), "in any other
court having jurisdiction" refer only to other federal courts such as territorial
courts and not to the various state courts.'2 Such an interpretation would regard
the right of action given to private parties as a new federal substantive right to
be enforced in a federal forum. This would not be creating concurrent federal and
state jurisdiction but would require the establishment of a federal common law.'$
An examination of the history and purposes of Section 303 will support the
aforementioned construction. The NLRA dealt solely with unfair labor practices
on the part of management and neither secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes,
nor any other union activities were made unlawful by statute. There was some
question whether the secondary boycott and particularly the jurisdictional dis-
pute, would have been recognized as common law torts. With the 1947 amendment
to NRLA, Congress recognized such conduct to be costly, reprehensible and sorely
condemned in the eyes of the public, and such activities were therefore outlawed.
Congress expressly, established the right of action in Section 303 (b) due to this
question of state's treatment of such conduct, both by statute and at common law.
8 61 STAT. 158, 159, 29 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 187(b) (1947).
9 Supra note 1 at 665-6.
10 Supra note 8.
11 LWU v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
12Ibid.
13 See Banner Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 90 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1950),
Schatte Inc. v. International Alliance T.S.E., 182 F.2d 158 (9th. Cir. 1950).
NOTES
The purpose was to achieve a uniform adjudication of such renedies and to uni-
versally outlaw such conduct. 14
When Section 303 is read in conjunction with Section 301, Congressional intent
to create new federal substantive rights enforceable only in a federal form is more
apparent. Section 301 expressly grants jurisdiction to any United States District
Court for actions of breach of bargain contracts. This jurisdiction is broadened
by the elimination of the diversity of citizenship requirement and the $3000 mini-
mum amount in controversy Section 303 is subject to the provisions of Section 301,
and even though it did not expressly elirmnate the need for diversity of citizenship,
courts have held that it is not required for an action for damages in a federal
court.15
This view of an exclusive federal right receives further support when an exam-
ination is made of the remedy provided by the act, to wit: " and shall recover
the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."' 16 Prima facie, this lan-
guage would preclude an award of punitive damages against a union found guilty
of conduct enumerated in Section 303 (a) In an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court sitting in Virginia, an action for damages was brought against a union
which had conducted a secondary boycott. 17 This was a violation of Section 303
and also an interference with contractual relations under Virginia tort law. The
federal judge relied on the common law principle that an aggravated and unjusti-
fied interference with contractual relations, in reckless disregard of the rights of
the contracting parties, justifies an award of exemplary or punitive damages. The
defendant cited authority in which identical statutory language prohibited recov-
ery of punitive damages.'i The court held that even though Section 303 did not
expressly provide for punitive damages, it did not expressly prohibit their recovery
This case was reversed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals on
grounds that Section 303 only allowed compensatory damages and that the lower
court could not decide on the basis of state common law, as there was no diversity
of citizenship. 19 This appears the better view as to punitive damages. If the Vir-
ginia District Court's view were to be followed, it would point to a concurrent
jurisdiction. This would give injured party a choice of remedy and allow him to
go into a state court and recover punitive damages and yet he would be limited
to actual damages in a federal court. Such a conclusion would directly thwart the
purpose behind the section which was to achieve uniformity of decision regarding
such conduct.
Although a reliance on Congressional intent can be illusory in the interpreta-
tion of the fine points of legisative construction, it will illuminate the question
of punitive damages and aid the courts in charting the undefined areas of jurisdic-
tion. There were several earlier cases holding unions liable for treble damages
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. ° Such a penalty on labor organizations was
14 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1953) (Short Title and Declaration of
Policy), H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
15 Supra note 13.
16 Supra note 8.
17 Patton v. United Mine Workers, 114 F.Supp. 596 (W.D. Va. 1953)
18 Penn. R.R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
19 United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954).
20 Loewe v Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), Coronado Coal Co. v UMW, 268 U.S. 295
(1925).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6
Nov., 1954]
bitterly opposed and later cases rejected this idea.21 The atmosphere in which the
Taft-Hartley amendment was incubated was one of extreme industrial unrest.
Thus an attempt to include a provision making unions liable in treble damages
was denounced3P The Senate debate over the punitive measure resulted in its re-
jection on the grounds that it would increase the dissention between employers and
unions and would only lead to demands that equally strong punitive measures be
made available against management.P Senator Taft introduced a nonpunitive
provision which was subsequently adopted in LMRA as Section 303. In defending
the provision, the Senator stated, "After all, it is only to restore to people who lose
something because of boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, the money they have
lost." 24 The whole tenor of testimony in hearings, the committee reports, con-
gressional debate and the final adoption of the nonpunitive clause, all seem to
indicate a congressional adversity to the imposition of punitive measures against
a union organization. This is consistent with the policy of the LMRA of equal
responsibility before the law and with the broader objective of eliminating indus-
trial strife. To reach these goals requires an equalizing of the bargaining positions
of labor and management, which would not be possible with punitive damages
imposed on one side or the other.
From the foregoing analysis, it appears that a state court cannot entertain a
common law action for damages for conduct also constituting an unfair labor prac-
tice when such conduct is within the narrower range of Section 303. To hold other-
wise would be to allow state jurisdiction in direct conflict to federal procedure and
policy. This conflict is no less repugnant when disguised as a common law tort
action for damages than an action under Section 303 of the LMRA.
The question then arises whether or not the legislative background of the
punitive damages problem could be extended to all actions for damages which are
also unfair labor practices. Such a view would be consistent with the desire for
uniformity and equality which is inherent in the Act. But if such was congressional
intent, it was not expressed in the provisions of the Act. Since there was no judicial
machinery established beyond Section 303, to deny state jurisdiction under the
broader range of Section 8 would create an immunity from tortious conduct. If it
is found in balancing the conflicting interests involved, that the purposes of the
Act should best be effectuated by the establishment of a federal forum for the
enforcement of damages, then solution must await legislative reform.
Frank E. Howard
21U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 219
(1938).22 House version contained such a provision in H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301
(1947), making unions liable under Sherman Act. The predecessor to Taft-Hartley, the Case
bill, contained a like provision but the bill was vetoed by President Truman.
23 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or LMRA, 1361, 1369-70 (comments of Senators Morse and
Taft); Hearings before Committee, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1381 (1947), 1 LEGISLATIVE HSTORY
oF LMRA 456-62; Note, 6 STrA. L. Rev. 555.
24 2 LEGIsrATIVE HISTORY oF LMRA 1371 .(1947).
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